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Abstract
   While peer punishment has been shown to increase group cooperation, there is open debate on 
how cooperative norms can emerge and on what motives drive individuals to punish. In a public 
good experiment we compared alternative punishment institutions and found (1) higher 
cooperation levels under a consensual punishment institution than under autonomous individual 
punishment; (2) similar cooperation levels under sequential and simultaneous punishment 
institutions.
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   Cooperation in groups is more likely to arise when peers can punish each other. The first wave 
of experiments on informal sanctions proved this point using a special punishment rule (Ostrom 
et al., 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2000). 1 Since then scholars have been experimenting with 
variants in the form of punishment that reflect the variety of unstructured interactions that could 
characterized a social group (Andreoni et al., 2003, Decker et al., 2003, Denant-Boemont et al., 
2007, Xiao and Houser, 2005, Camera and Casari, 2009, Casari, 2005, Henrich et al., 2006, 
Guererk et al., 2006). 
    Through a novel experimental design we tackle the issues of how a cooperative norm emerges 
and what motives drive individuals to punish (Camerer and Fehr, 2006, Boyd et al., 2003).  We 
show that the emergence of norms of cooperation critically depends on the form of peer 
punishment available. Inside a group there may be competing individual norms of behavior and 
the punishment institution available have a fundamental role in composing those norms and 
hence generating the group outcome. For a given group, either a cooperative norm or a free-
riding norm could emerge depending of the specific punishment institution. In the laboratory one 
can supply one punishment institution at a time and precisely isolate its effect on group 
cooperation. When everyone can punish without constraints (Baseline treatment), group 
cooperation is more easily crippled by a minority of individuals that are spiteful or obey to a 
free-riding norm. This has been documented by a number of studies (Gächter and Herrmann, 
2006, Houser et al., 2005, Cinyabuguma et al., 2004). We report about a form of peer 
punishment, the Consensual institution, which endogenously censors the free-riding norm and 
greatly enhances group performance. Under the Consensual rule a request to punish is ignored 
when punishment toward a specific group member is requested by one agent only. Hence, peer 
punishment is carried out only when there is a coalition of two or more agents that share the 
Blinded Manuscript (NO Author Details)
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same norm.  We document this “consensus dividend,” i.e. an overall high group performance, 
whenever a coalition is needed to carry out peer punishment. This virtuous institution represents 
an interesting variant of informal punishment as the experimenter never imposes any norm on 
who can or cannot be punished; these norms emerge endogenously from the interaction within 
the group. Groups with a social dynamic that resemble to this punishment rule can accrue a 
consensual dividend.
   A second result is that group members seem uninterested in coordinating their punishment 
actions. When information is given about how much others have already punished a group 
member, the subject does not adjust her punishment request accordingly. We call this surprising 
handling of such additional information the “coordination puzzle.” This result provides insights 
into the motivations for punishment because it suggests that the punisher derives her utility from 
the act of punishing in itself and not from achieving, in conjunction with other punishers, a total 
amount of punishment that would discourage the free-rider. If that is the case, group interaction 
with peer punishment will achieve aggregate efficiency only by accident. 
   This paper is structured into four Sections. In Section 1 we describe the experimental design 
and the predictions. Aggregate results are presented in Section 2, while individual punishment 
decision results are presented in Section 3. Conclusions follow in Section 4.
1. The Experimental Design
  Our design consists of a voluntary contribution public good with the opportunity to engage in 
peer-to-peer punishment. The experiment includes three treatments with distinct punishment 
rules, Baseline, Sequential, and Consensual.1 There are N=20 participants in each session. In 
every period the participants are randomly partitioned into four groups of n=5 individuals. A 
                                                
1 The instructions for the Consensual treatment can be found  in Appendix.
Page 4 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
3
session comprises two parts for a total of twenty periods of a public good game. While part 1 is a 
simple voluntary contribution to a public good game, in part 2 there is also a punishment 
opportunity. 
   Irregardless of the treatment, in part 1 (periods 1-10) there is no punishment opportunity. Every 
period each subject i receives an endowment of 20 tokens and chooses to contribute gi[0, 20] 
tokens to a group project along with other n-1 other subjects in her group. All contribution 
decisions are made simultaneously. Period earnings for subject i in periods 1-10 are:
π i1= y− gia∑
j= 1
n
g j (1)
where a=0.4 is the marginal per capita return from a contribution to the public good. At the end 
of each period subjects are informed about the total contribution gj to the project as well as 
contributions and earnings of every member in their group. In the stage game, full free–riding (gi
= 0) is the dominant strategy. This follows from ∂ π i1 /∂ gi = – 1 + a < 0. However, the group 
payoff ∑ i= 1
n
π i1 is maximized if each group member fully cooperates (gi =20) because 
∂∑ i= 1
n
π i1 /∂ gi = – 1 + na > 0.
      At the start of the session, we announce that the experiment has two parts but explain the 
rules just for the first part.2 No subject is ever informed about the identity of the other group 
members. No communication among subjects is allowed. After each period, subjects are 
randomly and anonymously re-matched in groups of five and the probability that an agent is re-
matched with the same four people is less than two percent.3
                                                
2 Each part was preceded by a trial period to familiarize the subjects with the software.
3
For conducting the experiments we used the software “z-Tree” developed by Urs Fischbacher (1998).
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    In part 2 (periods 11-20) subjects have an opportunity to punish others according to rules that 
differ in the three treatments. Each period includes two stages. At stage one, subjects 
simultaneously choose contribution levels. At stage two, subjects are informed about the 
individual contributions of all other group members. Moreover, a subject j can request to punish 
any of her group members i by assigning punishment points pij{0,1,…,7}. More precisely, 
every subject faces four decisions of assigning punishment points, one for every other person in 
her group; a subject cannot punish people outside her group.  Punishment rules differ by 
treatment.
   In the Baseline treatment punishment choices are simultaneous. At a private cost of one token 
per punishment point, an agent can decrease the earnings of any other individual in her group by 
three tokens. In the case an agent receives punishment points from two or more agents, her 
earnings reduction is the cumulative effect of all requests. This is a common protocol in the 
experimental literature, adopted, for instance, by Fehr and Gächter (2002).4 Period earnings for 
subject i in periods 11-20 are:
π i= πi1− 3∑ k≠ i pki −∑ k≠ i pik (2)
Session earnings were the sum of earnings in all periods. When deciding on punishment, the 
computer screen shows a table with each subject’s own contribution always listed in the first 
column and the remaining four subjects’ contributions listed in the other four columns without 
subject identifiers. This feature accomplishes several goals: it prevents the formation of 
individual reputations across periods; it makes it difficult to delay punishment to following 
periods; it makes it difficult to punish for revenge. At the end of a period, subjects can observe 
                                                
4 The fine-to-free ratio is constant at 3 to 1. Period earnings of a subject can be negative, although in the 
experiment that event was infrequent. When ignoring the punishment given to others, the frequency was 3.3% in 
periods 11-20. Cumulative earnings were always positive.
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the aggregate punishments imposed on them by the other group members, and the aggregate 
punishment imposed on other group members but do not know who requested such punishment.5
   In the Sequential treatment the only difference from the Baseline treatment is the timing of the 
punishment decisions. At stage one, subjects simultaneously choose contribution levels. Instead, 
in stage two a subject can punish each one of the other (n – 1) group members in (n – 1) separate 
steps. In step one each subject places a punishment request on a person. In step two, a subject 
places a punishment request on another person knowing how much punishment has been given to 
that person in step one by someone else. The process continues for four steps until a subject has 
had the opportunity to target every other member in her group.  To summarize, at step k agent i
can punish just agent j(k); the order of punishment decisions is random. Punishment points can 
be added but never subtracted. 
   When punishing, a subject knows at what step she is in the sequence and also the cumulative 
aggregate punishment imposed on each other group members up to the previous step (Varian, 
1994). Hence, in the Sequential treatment a subject receives more detailed information about 
punishment than in the Baseline treatment because she can see both the end-of-period sum and 
some disaggregated statistics about the individual components of this sum. However, she is not 
informed about the amount of punishment she has personally received until the end of the period.  
This provision is meant to prevent, as much as possible, a subject from using punishment to 
payback others for their requested punishments.
   In the Consensual treatment both contribution and punishment decisions are simultaneous. The 
peculiar aspect of consensual punishment is that an agent is punished only if at least two agents 
                                                
5 This provision can make a difference when subjects do not know the preferences of others. When a subject 
can only observe the punishment points she gave or received (Fehr and Gächter, 2000), learning about these 
preferences may be slower than here. In our setting, a subject can see if a social norm was enforced with respect to 
any other subject in her group.
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requested it. In practice, only a coalition of 40% of group members or larger is allowed to punish 
a person. When there is just one request to punish agent i, it has no effect. More precisely, agent i
keeps her stage one earnings without reduction and will not know of the punishment request. 
Moreover, there is no cost for requesting punishment if it is not carried out. Period earnings for 
subject i in periods 11-20 are:
π i= π i1− 3Ki∑ k≠ i pki −∑ k≠ i Kkpik (3)
where K(i) = 1 if ∑k I {i , k}≥ 2 and K(i) = 0 otherwise. The function I(i,k) equals one when 
agent k requests to punish agent i, pik >0, and equals zero otherwise. To carry out the 
punishment, the consensus must be who is the target and not necessarily the exact severity of the 
sanction.
      The canonical predictions for the experimental conditions just outlined are well known. If 
subjects apply the backward induction logic, the equilibrium prediction in all three treatments is 
that all subjects will contribute nothing to the public good and will punish nothing. In fact, 
choosing pji>0 is a monetary cost that does not generate any monetary benefit in a one-shot 
interaction. 
2. Aggregate Results
   A total of 240 subjects were recruited among the general undergraduate student population of 
the University of Siena via ads posted around campus asking to email or call. No subject had 
participated in this type of experiment before, and each subject participated in only one of the 
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twelve sessions. Payment was done privately in cash at the end of each session and averaged 
12.40 euros per subject.6
   In this section we present results on aggregate cooperation and net payoff (Results 1-3) while 
in the next session those concerning individual decisions to punish (Results 4-5).
RESULT 1: The existence of punishment opportunities causes a rise in the average contribution 
level from 17% to 29% of the endowment. In particular, while the average contribution rises in 
all treatments, the rise is largest in the Consensual treatment.
RESULT 2: In the no-punishment condition average contributions converge over time close to 
full free riding. In contrast, in the punishment condition average contributions are stable or 
increasing over time. In particular there is a steady growth in contribution levels in the 
Consensual treatment. 
   Support for Results 1 and 2 comes from Table 1 and Figure 1. Without a punishment 
opportunity the average individual contribution across all treatments is 3.31 tokens. When the 
opportunity to punish is introduced, the average individual contribution across all treatments is 
5.77. A Wilcoxon signed ranks test shows that this difference in contributions is significant at the 
two percent level (N=12). These average values hide a declining trend when there are no 
opportunities to punish - from 5.92 tokens in period one to 1.82 in period ten. With punishment 
opportunities there is a “jump” in period eleven when there is an average contribution of 5.21 
tokens and an ascending trend to 6.50 in period twenty. This jump in contribution between the 
last period without punishment and the first period with punishment is significant at a one 
percent level according to a Wilcoxon signed ranks test (N=12).
                                                
6    The average payment is $14.50 at the October 2003 conversion rate. This amount includes the show up 
fee that was 3 euros for the four sessions conducted before October and 5 euros afterwards. A “Token” was worth 
0.02 euros. Each session lasted between 1 hour and 50 minutes and 2 hours and 30 minutes including instructions 
reading.
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   Besides these common patterns, each punishment rule shows remarkable peculiarities. Overall 
contributions under a Consensual rule are substantially higher than in the other two (8.46 vs. 4.46 
Baseline and 4.38 Sequential).7 Moreover, while the time trend is increasing for the Consensual 
rule (period one-ten, 6.94-9.76), it is roughly stationary for the other two (4.01-5.65 Baseline, 
4.62-4.10 Sequential).  Another way to acpture these dynamics is to compare net earnings 
considering punishment expenditure and costs over time (Result 3). There exists a relative payoff 
loss within a treatment if the net earnings in period t under the punishment condition are lower 
than the earnings in period t under the no punishment condition.
RESULT 3: The punishment condition initially caused a relative payoff loss. In the Baseline and 
Sequential treatments the relative payoff losses remained throughout all periods, although they 
became smaller over time. Payoff losses and gains differ by treatment especially when 
considering the last periods. In the final period of the Baseline and Sequential treatments the 
relative payoff loss was roughly 20 percent. In the final period of the Consensual treatment the 
relative payoff gain was 13 percent. 
   When normalizing the earnings in the final period of the no punishment condition to 100, then 
earnings in the first period with punishment are equal to 57 in the Baseline treatment, 53 in the 
Sequential, and 85 in the Consensual. By the end of the session, all of these values have 
increased. While the Baseline is at 80 and the Sequential is at 78, which are still below the 
reference value without punishment, the Consensual treatment is above, at 113.
   Interestingly, the high cooperation level of the Consensual treatment was achieved with the 
lowest level of punishment among all treatments. This is the key point that accounts for its 
superiority in terms of group net earnings. Let us define the “punishment rate” as the number of 
                                                
7 There is considerable variance in the effect of the consensual punishment rule. In particular the jump in 
contribution is driven by two sessions out of four.
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punishment points assigned to a particular contribution action. The average punishment rate is
∑ t= 1
10 ∑ j
n∑ k≠ j
n
pk , t
j /10n for Baseline and Sequential and 
∑ t= 1
10 ∑ j
n
Kj∑ k≠ j
n
pk , t
j /10n for Consensual. The average punishment rate was 1.70 in the 
Consensual compared to 2.47 in the other two treatments (Table 2). For any given contribution 
level, lower punishment rates translate into a smaller deadweight loss. One reason for the lower 
punishment rate is that all punishment requests made by just one agent were ignored. Had those 
requests not been ignored, the punishment rate in the Consensual treatment would have been 
29.4 percent higher than our reported rate. 
   What cries for an explanation is how a lower threat of punishment observed in the Consensual 
treatment could provide not weaker but stronger incentives to cooperate that in the other 
treatments.  The reason is that the Consensual rule endogenously filtered out the anti-social norm 
of a minority that was targeting cooperators, thus enhancing the incentives to cooperate. While 
less than one out of every ten requests to target full free-riders was censored, more than seven 
out of ten attempts to punish strong cooperators with contributions (15,20] were blocked (Table 
2). We will come back to this point in the next section. The Baseline and Sequential rule instead 
allowed a minority to freely harm strong cooperators and hence lower incentives for cooperation. 
   What stands out in the analysis of group cooperation levels across treatments is the superiority 
of the Consensual rule. This rule generated punishment costs 10 percent lower that the Baseline 
rule and realized a contribution level 90 percent higher.
3. Individual contribution and punishment decisions
   A data analysis at the individual level gives additional insights into the performance of peer 
punishment institutions. We first present Results 4 and 5 about the frequency of multiple 
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punishment requests on the same target and then detailed econometric models on punishment 
and contribution choices. 
RESULT 4: In the Baseline treatment, approximately half of the times that a subject is punished, 
two or more subjects have requested the punishment. 
Support for Result 4 can be found in Table 3. To interpret this result, it is important to consider 
that in about 92% of the instances one group member could carry out single-handedly the whole 
punishment. A subject could distribute up to seven points of punishment to another subject. 8 A 
total of eight or more points were distributed to a subject only in 8.2% of the cases. It follows 
that the multiplicity of requests to punish the same agent is not a response to the need to punish 
free riders more severely because almost always one agent could have done it alone.  
   We consider two possible explanations for this multiplicity of punishment requests for the 
same target in the Baseline treatment:
(a) Under the interpretation that peer punishment is a “second order public good,” Result 4 
could be evidence of a coordination failure. Assume that some agents are willing to 
punish the free riders if no one else does. According to the “second order public good” 
view those agents derive utility from having an agent punished and hence are willing to 
pay a private cost to punish. An agent of the type above would happily free ride on 
punishment if she knows that somebody else will punish. For instance, if it is common 
knowledge that agent i wants to punish a given target for 3 points and agent k wants to 
punish for 6 points, then agent i can free ride on the punishment of agent k. Different 
                                                
8   Seven points of punishment reduces earnings by 21 tokens, which implies an earning reduction between 
40% and 105%. 
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choices may occur if there is uncertainty about agents’ punishment preferences, which 
can explain Result 4 as a coordination failure.9
(b) In another interpretation subjects’ decisions to punish do not depend on how much others 
punish the same subject. Stated differently, if a subject gains utility only from her 
personal punishment action then she does not care about the total amount of punishment 
received by the targeted subject. This preference structure could describe a strong 
emotional drive in the motivations for punishment. In that case no strategic element 
would enter into the punishment decision and the multiplicity of punishment requests 
would cease to be a puzzle. It would simply reflect the plurality of subjects in each group 
with a preference for punishment. 
   Under the “emotional” interpretation of punishment decisions (b), the procedural differences 
between Baseline and Sequential would be irrelevant for punishers. As described in  the next 
result, the data provide more support for (b) than for (a), the “second order public good” 
interpretation.
RESULT 5: In the Sequential treatment th re is no improvement in coordination in punishment 
in comparison with the Baseline treatment. In particular, we observe across treatments similar 
frequencies of multiple requests to punish the same subject and similar distributions of total 
punishment received by free riders. 
   The similarity in the multiplicity of requests to punish is detailed in Table 3. According to 
coordination in punishment decisions is easier in the Sequential than in the Baseline treatment 
because later movers in the sequence have additional information on the punishment already 
assigned to the target. As a consequence, one may expect in the Sequential data a lower number 
                                                
9 Under (a) there is a parallel between consensual peer punishment and contributions to a threshold public 
good with refunding. While in public goods experiments the threshold is generally on the aggregate contribution 
level, here the threshold is in terms of number of punishers, irregardless of the level of punishment requested.
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of group members targeting the same agent than in the Baseline. Empirically, that does not seem 
to be the case (Table 3).
We cannot rule out that the information acquired throughout the steps of punishment 
enters into the decisional process. Yet, the data suggest that this information is not used 
according to the “second order public good” interpretation (a).  Table 4 presents a detailed 
econometric model on why subjects punish and allows a comparison of punishment expenditure 
when a subject was alone in punishing the target with the cases when everyone in the group 
punished the target. In step 1, there is no significant difference in the estimated coefficients. The 
subject may have not cared that other would also punish in future steps (interpretation b) or may 
have been unable to predict future punishment choices (interpretation a). In step 4, if nobody 
punished the target before, punishment is significantly higher than if three people already 
punished the target. This evidence is compatible with interpretation (a), because one may 
conclude that subject cared whether others punished the target. The evidence though is weak. 
First of all a significant difference between the two coefficients was found also for the other 
treatments. Moreover, in a modified step 4 regression (unreported) with independent variables 
for two, three, and four people punishing the target, one cannot reject the hypothesis that they are 
all equal (p-value=0.27).
   The evidence on total punishment received by free riders provides further support in the same 
direction. When two or more subjects in a group are willing to punish there could be a problem 
in coordinating punishment. If there is an improvement in coordination, one would expect to see 
in the Sequential results less variability in the punishment received by free riders, i.e. a reduction 
in the number of free riders escaping punishment or receiving extremely high punishments. Also 
this conjecture about an improvement in coordination is not supported in the data. We present 
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data relative to groups where two or more members contributed positive amounts and where at 
least one complete free rode (zero contribution). These situations are very common as they 
account for 68.1% of the groups in the Baseline and 70.6% in the Sequential treatment. 
Typically, the complete free riders received a heavy punishment, an average of 4.83 points in the 
Baseline and of 4.32 points in the Sequential. The actual punishment did vary widely in level 
from 0 to 19 points. Yet, the empirical distributions of the punishment points targeting complete 
free riders are surprisingly similar between Baseline and Sequential treatment. A Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions cannot reject the equality hypothesis (p-value 
of 0.34, N=183, 219).10 We conclude that the additional information provided in the Sequential 
compared to the Baseline treatment did not significantly change either the level or the dispersion 
of punishment decisions (the standard deviation in punishment points actually grows slightly 
from 3.46 in the Baseline to 3.85 in the Sequential). To sum up, there is a puzzle here for 
interpretation (a), as the additional information available in the Sequential treatment was not 
used accordingly.
The remaining of this section further discusses the motivations of punishers, the effects of 
sanctions on cooperation levels, and the peculiarity of the consensual treatment. Why do people 
punish? There are three main findings common to all treatments from the regressions in Table 4. 
First, the contribution level of the target matters. Punishment is heavier for the lowest contributor 
in the group and lighter for the highest contributor. Previous studies find a similar result while 
employing as regressor the target’s contribution minus the group average contribution. Our 
specification avoids any hypothesis on the functional form of the relationship. Second, when 
                                                
10 The test assumes observations are independent. If there is dependence the result of no significant 
differences may be even stronger.
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others are punished in the previous period, this encourages the subject to punish more. This 
“imitation” effect in punishment is stronger than the “blind revenge” effect of punishing after 
having been personally punished in the previous period. Third, the contribution level in the part 
without sanctions is a poor predictors of punishment choices. In particular, we do not find 
subjects who are cooperating type and who will punish when the opportunity is given. Subjects 
who free-ride without sanction, may also be willing to engage in punishment when given a 
chance. Requests to punish are context-specific and depend from the subject’s relative 
contribution within the period.
What is the effect of sanctions on contribution choices? From the regressions in Table 5 
there are four main findings common to all treatments. First, the immediate consequence of 
receiving punishment is to lower contribution levels, which runs contrary to our intuition. This 
effect is highly significant and concerns punishment received both in the previous and in the 
second previous periods.  Second, after requesting punishing in the previous period the subject 
also lowers her contribution level. This behavior could be interpreted as a trigger strategy 
following a norm violation. The subject punishes directly through punishment points and 
indirectly through withholding future cooperation. Third, punishment boosts cooperation because 
the subject observes that others, especially free-riders, have been punished. This seems to be the 
main positive effect of punishment on contribution. The exception is when the highest contributor 
in the group was punished in the previous period, which has a negative impact on contribution 
levels. We label the latter behavior “perverse punishment” and will return to it in a moment.
Forth, the average contribution in the part without sanctions is a good predictor of contribution in 
the part with sanctions. There seem to be subject types when it comes to contribution choices.
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When subjects punished, about 57.2% of the times they targeted the lowest contributor in 
their group. Interestingly enough, about 8.7% of the times they targeted the highest contributor in 
their group (perverse punishment). We scrutinized the subjects who targeted the highest 
contributor and why they did it. The pattern of perverse punishment was roughly stable over 
time. Revenge could explain some of it as the amount of punishment received is correlated with 
the frequency of perverse punishment. In particular, if the subject received no punishment in the 
previous period, she targeted the highest contributor with a frequency of 1.8% (N=4440). This 
frequency more than doubles if the subject received punishment (3.8%, N=5160). In particular, 
for a heavy punishment of eight or more points the frequency is 7.0% (N=644).  Some perverse 
punishment may also be due to trembling hand. Only a minority of subjects though engaged in 
perverse punishment at least once (37.9% of subjects). They generally contributed less (4.1 
tokens vs. 6.8) and requested more punishment than others (3.0 points per period vs. 1.7). 
Interestingly, their punishment was not exclusively perverse. In 46.3% of the cases they targeted 
the lowest contributor while in 35.1% of the cases they targeted the highest contributor.
The effectiveness of the consensual treatment in promoting cooperation could lie in its 
ability to censor perverse punishment. Most perverse punishment is requested by one person only 
(70%, all treatments) and hence was often not carried out. This contrast with punishment directed 
toward the lowest contributors, which was requested by one person only in 12.1% of the cases, 
hence highly likely to be carried out also in the consensual treatment. Table 4 reports estimates 
for requested versus actual punishment, which is in line with this interpretation. Punishment is 
generally lower when the target was the highest contributor in the group and this effect is 
stronger for actual than for requested punishment. This evidence concerns the relative 
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contribution of the target and complements the findings on absolute contribution showed in 
Table 2.
4. Conclusions
   We study group cooperation in the provision of a public good under three peer punishment 
institutions, where agents have a costly opportunity to decrease the earnings of others in the 
absence of any personal material benefit. While this study replicates and confirms the robustness 
of the qualitative results of other experiments (Ostrom et al., 1992, Fehr and Gächter, 2002, 
Andreoni et al., 2003, Egas and Riedl, 2005), it also points to the significant impact of the 
specific punishment institution. There are three major conclusions. 
   First, the consensual institution of peer punishment performs remarkably better than the others 
(“consensus dividend”). This study has identified a specific set of rules that promotes a strong 
effect on group cooperation. Under a consensual institution, other-regarding preferences 
dominate the social interaction (Camerer and Fehr, 2006).  When punishment toward a specific 
group member is requested by one agent only, the request to punish is ignored. Hence, there is 
actual punishment only when two or more agents requested it. Under a consensual institution, 
contributions and earnings are higher than when everyone has full discretionality on whom to 
punish. Without any external interference, this punishment rule aggregates individual norms 
within the group in a virtuous way that favors the emergence of the cooperative norm. 
   Second, we gained insights into the motivations that drive agents to punish. Changes in 
strategic incentives and information levels have surprisingly little effect in peer punishment 
behavior. Under the Sequential institution a subject about to punish a “target” individual knows 
how much other group members have already punished the individual. One would expect a 
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lighter punishment request if the target has already received a sanction and a heavier request 
otherwise. Instead, when the above information is provided the subject mostly ignores it, i.e. 
does not adjust her punishment request. We call this disregard for potentially useful information 
the “coordination puzzle.” More work is needed on this point but it suggests that the punisher 
derives her utility from the act of punishing in itself and not from achieving, in conjunction with 
other punishers, a total amount of punishment that would discourage the free-rider. This 
interpretation casts doubts on the view that peer punishment is intentionally provided by subjects 
as a second-order public good (Ostrom et al., 1992, Sober and Wilson, 1998). According to this 
view subjects should care about the total punishment that another agent receives, and hence have 
no objections to others doing the “dirty job” of punishing. They should actually prefer it because 
it saves them the punishment cost.  That may imply that when it comes to other-regarding 
attitudes, emotions alter the ability of people to behave strategically.
   The third conclusion concerns the efficiency consequences of peer punishment. Peer 
punishment is not inherently efficiency-enhancing; it could damage group net earnings or boost 
them depending of what specific form of peer punishment is available in the social situation. We 
find that in two out of three treatments the ability to punish lowers net earnings. Anthropological 
studies of societies without a judicial system have pointed to the danger of the spontaneous 
human tendency to engage in peer punishment (Lowie, 1970, Girard, 1977, p.16-22). Judicial 
systems are regulated forms of punishment that attempt to replace to some degree peer 
punishment in enforcing social norms. Our findings on the Consensual rule provide indirect 
support for the role of a legal system in the administration of punishment. Legal systems restrict 
sanctioning to the violation of shared rules and censor individual attempts to punish socially 
virtuous actions, hence channeling agents’ punishment attitudes toward beneficial ends for 
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society (Kosfeld and Riedl, 2004; Casari and Plott, 2003). More research is needed to explore the 
behavioral foundations of punishment through legal systems.
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Table 1: Individual contributions by session
Treatment Baseline Consensual Sequential
Session date 3/27 10/15 10/17 10/23 5/22 9/16 10/16 10/21 4/14 10/16 10/20 10/22
avg (sd)
No 
punishment 
3.54
(5.58)
4.40
(6.08)
2.57
(4.34)
3.34
(5.56)
2.56
(4.13)
5.07
(6.26)
3.91
(5.49)
2.27
(4.09)
2.80
(4.85)
4.00
(5.66)
3.07
(4.92)
2.19
(3.62)
With  
punishment
7.74
(5.42)
5.14
(5.25)
2.62
(3.12)
2.36
(2.49)
14.11
(6.54)
11.26
(6.59)
5.89
(4.51)
2.57
(2.93)
4.18
(5.68)
5.53
(4.36)
2.42
(4.57)
5.41
(4.87)
Notes: Sessions were conducted in 2003
Table(s)
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Table 2: Punishment rates by contribution
Individual 
contribution
Baseline Sequential Consensual
Avg. points Avg. points Assigned
(1)
Requested
(2)
Difference
(2) – (1)
% Censored
[(2) – (1)] /(2)
0 4.55 3.62 4.84 5.13 0.28 5.5%
(0, 5] 1.98 2.26 1.36 1.77 0.41 23.1%
(5, 10] 1.30 1.62 1.62 2.11 0.49 23.2%
(10, 15] 0.49 1.24 1.34 2.03 0.69 34.1%
(15, 20] 0.56 1.42 0.25 0.93 0.68 73.2%
Total 2.41 2.54 1.70 2.20 0.50 22.8%
Notes: (1) Each individual contribution action is classified into one of five levels; then the average number of points 
of punishment received is computed (2,400 obs., i.e. 800 for each treatment). (2) The minimum number of 
observations in each cell of the Consensual columns is 113.
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Table 3: Frequency of punishment
Baseline Sequential Consensual
Contribution choices not punished 32.1% 27.4% 66.3%
Of which: One request to punish - - 26.3%
Contribution choices  punished 67.9% 72.6% 33.9%
Of which:  One request to punish 32.5% 35.8% -
                Two requests to punish 20.0% 23.1% 18.8%
                Three requests to punish 12.0% 11.1% 10.4%
                Four requests to punish 3.4% 2.6% 4.6%
Total
(No. of observations)
100.0%
(800)
100.0%
(800)
100.0%
(800)
Page 25 of 28
Ac
ce
pte
d M
an
us
cri
pt
Table 4: Determinants of punishment expenditure (punishment given)
Baseline Sequential Consensual
all all step 1 step 4 All, actual 
punshment
All,  
requests  
to 
punish
Average subject’s contribution without -0.01 0.06 0.04 -0.01 0.06 0.05
   sanctions(periods 1-10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Target was the lowest contributor in 2.22*** 1.53*** 1.84*** 1.31*** 2.42*** 2.16***
   her group (0.29) (0.34) (0.43) (0.43) (0.24) (0.21)
Target was the highest contributor in -1.29*** -0.74*** -1.16*** -0.02 -2.96*** -1.62***
   her group (0.24) (0.22) (0.38) (0.42) (0.49) (0.20)
Subject’s contribution minus average 0.06* 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.06** 0.04*
   group contribution (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02)
Average contribution of subject’s other 0.01 0.02* 0.02 0.01 0.005 0.004
   group members in previous period (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Punishment received by other group 0.06*** 0.08*** 0.05*** 0.05** 0.10*** 0.10***
   members in previous period (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Punishment received by subject in the -0.006 0.02 0.02 0.06 -0.0009 0.02
   previous period (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Punishment received by subject in the -0.01 -0.04 -0.11** -0.003 0.08** 0.08***
   second previous period (0.03) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
The subject was alone in  punishing the 4.24*** 4.24*** 3.91*** 5.04*** 4.25***
   target in the period – dummy (a) (0.52) (0.36) (0.47) (0.62) (0.48)
Everyone punished the target in the 3.22*** 3.00*** 3.00*** 3.42*** 2.62*** 2.54***
   period – dummy (b) (0.44) (0.37) (0.84) (0.49) (0.38) (0.36)
Step 1 0.14
(0.17)
Step 4 -0.32**
(0.14)
Constant -3.35*** -4.01*** -3.73*** -3.76*** -4.68*** -4.14***
(0.66) (0.75) (0.82) (0.75) (0.65) (0.51)
Observations, no. subjects 2560, 80 2560, 80 640, 80 640, 80 2560, 80 2560, 80
Pseudo R-squared 0.175 0.153 0.177 0.158 0.206 0.220
Log likelihood -2318 -2412 -650.4 -534.6 -1700 -2032
F-test: p-value for (a)=(b) 0.000 0.002 0.281 0.005 - 0.000
Note: (1) Tobits with individual random effects. (2)  Dependent variable: request by subject i to punish subject k≠i; 
in every period there are four observations for each subject. (3) Session and period dummies were included in the 
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regression but are not reported. (4) Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. (5) If 
everyone in a group contributed the same amount there was neither a lowest nor a highest group contributor.
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Table 5: Determinants of individual contribution to the public good 
under the punishment condition
Baseline Sequential Consensual
Average subject’s contribution without 0.47*** 0.85*** 0.36**
   sanctions(periods 1-10) (0.18) (0.20) (0.14)
Average contribution of subject’s other group 0.15*** 0.12*** 0.19***
   members in previous period (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Punishment received by other group members in 0.20*** 0.23*** 0.35***
   previous period (0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
Punishment received by subject in the previous -0.44*** -0.75*** -0.65***
   Period (0.08) (0.17) (0.12)
Punishment received by subject in the second -0.13** -0.43** -0.26***
   previous period (0.06) (0.17) (0.10)
Punishment expenditure of the subject in the previous -0.16* -0.17 -0.28**
   Period (0.08) (0.10) (0.13)
In the previous period  the lowest contributor in her 0.36 3.23** 0.44
   group was punished (0.72) (1.38) (0.60)
In the previous period  the highest contributor in her -1.47*** -1.12** -2.64*
   group was punished (0.41) (0.55) (1.47)
Constant -1.63 -4.52** 3.64*
(1.12) (1.87) (1.91)
Observations, No.subjects 640, 80 640, 80 640, 80
Pseudo R-squared 0.118 0.101 0.155
Log likelihood -1494 -1378 -1619
Note: (1) Tobits with individual random effects. (2) Session and period dummies were included in the regression but 
are not reported.  (3) If everyone in a group contributed the same amount  there was neither a lowest nor a highest 
group contributor. (4)  Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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 Figure 1: Contribution to the public good over time
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